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1962/03/21

Presented by
Don Casey 21 Mar 62

BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

21 Mar 62

Concerning the status of DOD plans and activities to date - our first completed action was to obtain a DOD/JCS position as to the military's stake and proposed role in the ousting of the Castro Communist regime. Basically, the policy reflected in this paper establishes that the military will support State and CIA as necessary during the preparatory phase of Operation Mongoose in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases. It also establishes the point that the military believe the continued existence of the Castro Communist regime is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. It further makes the point that the military could intervene overtly in Cuba without serious offense to national or world public opinion if:

2. (C) a. We moved in response to a humanitarian requirement to restore

order within Cuba;

(36) b. If we announced incident to going in; that we were moving in to restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that they had the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations;

(3c) c. If the operation was conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures was reduced to the minimum.

(7) We feel very strongly that without damage to their international position and simply by making the decision to do so, the Soviets can take a page from our book and establish an overseas military base or bases in Cuba. This would greatly increase our national vulnerability and our defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted

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to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

(5) The Soviets have an option on which they can foreclose at any time. They can make the decision to establish military bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure, and if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove them without initiating World War III. Consequently, we feel it is mandatory that we face the facts squarely now, and determine as early as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Communism by covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally mandatory, for logistic and planning purposes, that we have an early decision as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fail.

(6a)
7 We also feel strongly that the United States should intervene to preserve Cuban nationals identified as being

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essential to the establishment of a friendly Cuban government if they are in danger of being exterminated by a widespread Hungarian type blood purge.

In furtherance of the DOD/JCS policy that any military intervention should be conducted as quickly as possible, and with sufficient force to minimize the Communist Bloc's capability to react, we are working with CINCLANT in attempting to reduce the reaction time of his contingency plans for moving into Cuba, and at the same time to beef up his capability so that there will be no doubt as to the US ability to move in and take over rapidly regardless of the opposition we may meet.

Our primary plan can be activated

[REDACTED] and provides for confronting Cuban forces

sufficient strength to be clearly
beyond Cuban capability to resist, to
induce early capitulation of their units
and to avoid needless loss of life.

A secondary plan can be activated [REDACTED] 16

although this plan involves a degree of
risk [REDACTED] 16

CINCLANT is planning to reduce these
reaction times through prepositioning of
forces and material. This planning effort
should soon provide us a basis for deci-
sion [REDACTED] 16

We feel that there is an alarming lack
of appreciation that time is running out -
that we cannot let this operation drag
on for an indefinite number of years,
hoping to develop a massive resistance
capability within Cuba. We are concerned
that the new proposal de-emphasizes the
time factor by waiting until July before

a decision is made as to what to do next. This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to foreclose on the options open to them, viz., entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/or the establishment of Soviet bases in Cuba. Either one of these actions would add new dimensions to our problem, and introduce considerations which would postpone positive action indefinitely if not preclude for the foreseeable future the elimination of the Communist regime.


9(b) In the event that the coming months may disprove the feasibility of initiating an internal revolt in Cuba, it is suggested that Phase II might be sparked with the execution of a Cover and Deception Plan. Normal training of US forces would be the primary cover; the deception would be concurrent efforts to convince the Communist Cuban government that we were in fact invading Cuba. This course of action could provide adequate provocation for US intervention depending, of course,

on Cuban rashness in their reaction.

16) If successful, we might not have to
engage in the more difficult and dangerous
game of developing pretexts, although
we should include this requirement as a
final resort to assure successful initia-
tion of Phase II.

As I previously mentioned, one of our
primary responsibilities is supporting
CIA. To date, CIA has submitted several
requests for support. In each case,
action was initiated immediately and the
request processed expeditiously. These
requests included:


1a.  b

1a)  b
(DOD has approved this request pro-
vided national policy permitted train-
ing of Cubans on US military bases).

b.  16

(The following day, the


Chief of Naval Operations approved
the request



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(11c) c. Advice and assistance from BJ
Unit No. 2 in testing certain simula-
tion devices. (Direct contact with
BJ No. 2 and appropriate CIA personnel
was authorized)

(11d) D. CIA has infomally requested the
Navy to obtain




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The Navy is currently waiting CIA's formal request.)

e. CIA submitted a request to DOD

11e



This request raised several national policy decisions necessary to permit fulfillment of the request. These policy decisions are:

(1) Whether, and/or to what extent a policy of non-attribution to the US Government will apply to projects in connection with the activities of the CSG.

(2) Whether, and/or to what extent US bases and facilities should be utilized for training Cuban refugees.


(3) Whether, and/or to what extent US Armed Forces personnel will be

employed on CSG projects and if so,
whether, and/or to what extent they
will be non-attributable.

(4) Whether, and/or to what extent
US Armed Forces personnel will be
employed within the territorial
boundaries of Cuba.

(5) Whether, and/or to what extent
overflights of Cuba for purposes of
leaflet drops, resupply and diversion
will be permitted.

(6) Whether, and/or to what extent




(7) Whether, and/or to what extent
use of British-controlled and other
foreign areas for staging areas will
be permitted.

(8) What is the priority of Opera-
tion Mongoose, as compared to other
projects and operations.

We have also prepared an assessment of
the risk involved in air resupply missions

over Cuba.

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[REDACTED] 16
[REDACTED] for air resupply missions to
agents within Cuba, and we are assisting
CIA with its maritime needs, including 16
[REDACTED]

and providing operational concepts on
disrupting or destroying Cuban capability
of maritime coastal patrols.

In order to accomplish our assigned
tasks, I have a working group with full-
time representatives from ~~J-1, J-2, J-3,~~
~~J-4, J-5, J-6, SA/P&B and DIA~~ *the Joint Staff*
and the Services and DIA who serve,
as representatives of their respective
~~Directors~~ *Boards of Control* and as action officers in
dealing directly with their respective
~~Directorates.~~ *Chief*

Further, I have representatives of
each of the Services who also serve full-
time on the working group. They work
directly with three people on the Service
staffs; the Operations Deputy, the
Deputy for Plans, and one action
officer.

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Obviously, my working group cannot staff all the tasks placed upon us, consequently, whenever possible, we sanitize the tasks and have them accomplished by the Joint Staff or the regular Service staffs.